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13 Is the behavioral approach a form
of scientiﬁc imperialism?
An analysis of law and policy
Magdalena Małecka and Robert Lepenies
Introduction
The legal sciences are currently witnessing a sweeping intellectual transforma-
tion. Applications of behavioral sciences to law and policy (henceforth: the
behavioral approach) are now a ﬂourishing and expanding ﬁeld of academic
inquiry.1 Outcomes of this research, even though often still preliminary, are
eagerly adopted by policymakers interested in enacting laws and regulations
that more eﬀectively impact citizens’ behavior.2 The rapid development and
growing popularity of behaviorally informed analyses of law has, however, also
been met with skepticism. Are the legal and policy sciences the target of
“behavioral imperialism”?
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we would like to understand the
behavioral approach by using conceptual distinctions made in the philosophy of
science in discussions on scientiﬁc imperialism. Second, we would like to shed
light on scientiﬁc imperialism – on its deﬁnition and assessment.
Proponents of bringing the behavioral sciences to law (henceforth: beha-
vioralists) share the conviction that it is necessary and important that references
to ﬁndings of the behavioral sciences should be made in order for law and policy
to be informed by more “realistic” models of human behavior in legal and
policy settings. The authors of the foundational texts of this movement say: “The
task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to explore the implica-
tions of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for the law” (Jolls et al. 1998,
1476, our emphasis). Behavioralists advocate a “systematic framework” that
aims both to “explain the eﬀects and content of law” and “model and predict
behavior relevant to law” (ibid., 1474).3 They are interested in producing
policy-relevant scholarship, which is based on empirical evidence and thereby
“empirically informed” (Sunstein 2011; Strassheim and Kettunen 2014).
Behavioralists, so we argue, understand law primarily as an instrument that
inﬂuences human behavior. Their goal is to see how a new understanding of
human behavior “bears on the actual operation and possible improvement of
the legal system” (Jolls et al. 1998, 1480). Behavioralists hence believe both that
there is an accessible body of scientiﬁc knowledge about the regularities and
patterns of human behavior, and further, that behavioral scientiﬁc ﬁndings can
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and should be used in order to inform law and policy, which as a result will
lead to “better” (that is, more eﬀective) legal regulations.4
Recently, the impact of behavioral analysis for the legal sciences has become
a topic that is under increasing scrutiny. Commentators have begun to ask
whether and how the behavioral approach changes the legal sciences – and
whether a widespread application of behavioral sciences to law is justiﬁable.5 It
is here that we draw the connection to the debate of scientiﬁc imperialism.
Scholars thinking about scientiﬁc imperialism have asked themselves a similar
question: when (if ever) does a scientiﬁc theory, research program, or discipline
encroach unduly upon another? Further, why could this be problematic? The
recent debate on scientiﬁc imperialism in the philosophy of science promises to
oﬀer some guidance in answering these questions. Here, the debate has
revolved around the question of the permissibility of the application of scientiﬁc
theories and methods outside the discipline in which they were initially intro-
duced (which will also be referred to as “scientiﬁc trespassing”). Philosophers of
science have attempted to clarify what it means for a theory or a discipline to
be applied outside its own ﬁeld or domain, and whether such an application
can be understood as imperialistic. 6 Attempts to identify instances of scientiﬁc
imperialism have sometimes been accompanied by formulating criteria for
evaluation.
The starting point here is the account of scientiﬁc imperialism proposed by
Uskali Mäki (2013), in which he deﬁnes scientiﬁc imperialism and situates
recent voices in the debate7 on scientiﬁc imperialism. According to Mäki, sci-
entiﬁc imperialism is a phenomenon that may occur between two disciplines.
Thus, for him, scientiﬁc imperialism is a “dynamic interdisciplinary relation-
ship.” Mäki then distinguishes between certain types of imperialism: imperial-
ism of scope, imperialism of style, and imperialism of standing. He argues that
imperialistic advances should be constrained if they do not advance the pursuit
of explanatory uniﬁcation across disciplinary boundaries. He also argues that
scientiﬁc imperialism can be deﬁned “neutrally in terms of scope, style and
standing in interdisciplinary relations” (Mäki 2013, 338).8
In this chapter, we investigate and modify Mäki’s account. We argue that
scientiﬁc imperialism occurs when some novel applications of methods, the-
ories, and research programs are favored at the expense of other methods, or
theories, or research programs. For the identiﬁcation of scientiﬁc imperialism, we
argue that an account of imperialism of standing is needed. Yet, we claim that any
account of scientiﬁc imperialism relies upon a corresponding understanding of
scientiﬁc progress that cannot be disentangled from it. Imperialistic practices are
justiﬁed by imperialists, or rebuked by the imperialized, in light of what they
each believe to be scientiﬁc progress.
The structure of this chapter is the following. First, we introduce the beha-
vioral approach as a relatively recent, powerful intellectual development in law
and policy that may be regarded as imperialistic. Second, we note that the
behavioral approach can be seen a manifestation of a longer trend within the
legal sciences and we show why this observation matters for the discussion of
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scientiﬁc imperialism. Third, we bring the current debate on scientiﬁc imperi-
alism to bear on these developments. In this process, we both learn more about
the behavioral approach but also discover some shortcomings in the philoso-
phical debate on scientiﬁc imperialism. Fourth, we propose an amended
account of scientiﬁc imperialism. The account builds upon Mäki’s notion of
imperialism of standing by considering the concrete consequences of scientiﬁc
trespassing. This then calls for the empirical analysis of the position and power
that certain theories or research programs can gain. The account, however, also
considers the importance of the notion of scientiﬁc progress for deﬁning sci-
entiﬁc imperialism. Fifth, we analyze the behavioral approach in light of our
account of scientiﬁc imperialism.
1 What is the behavioral approach?
By behavioral approach we mean the contemporary approach to law and policy
based on the latest ﬁndings in the behavioral sciences. This approach, which
surfaced in the 1990s with increased attention to the research in behavioral
economics and cognitive psychology, has since become a heterogeneous ﬁeld
of study, encompassing behavioral law and economics, heuristics and law,
experimental and empirical studies on law, and a normative approach built
upon behavioral insights in law and policy (also called behavioral public policy).
Here, “nudges” are clearly the most prominent, visible, and contested example
in public policy (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
The behavioral approach developed to a great extent as the result of criticism
of one of the most consequential and contentious developments in the legal sciences
in recent times – the economic analysis of law, which is based on the premise
that the legal sciences should analyze law by applying neoclassical economic
theories and their style of inquiry (Posner 1977; Cooter and Ulen 2004; Shavell
2009). Economic analysis of law has been criticized for being imperialistic from
a variety of perspectives (see White 2015; Medema 1998; Epstein 1997; Zelit-
zer 1988; Kelman 1988), and has even declared itself as imperialistic (see
Cooter 1981; Becker 1968; and compare Landes and Posner 1993).
The behavioral approach, being a reaction to the perceived deﬁciencies of
the economic analysis of law, promised “new and better understandings of
decision and choice” (Sunstein 1997, 1). Behavioralists claimed that a more
“realistic” theory was needed, grounded in empirical (and preferably experi-
mental) works. For them, this meant that a theory should be able to explain
and predict the impact of law and serve as a basis of policy recommendations.
In the behavioral approach to law, a particular emphasis is put on experiments.
Sunstein, for example, writes that it is important to “instil a culture of experi-
mentation and evaluation” in law- and policymaking (Sunstein 2011, 1362).
Reliance on experimental methods – and often more generally, empirical
methods – is treated as a proper way of both testing hypotheses and collecting
observations of behavior that can be a basis for the formulation of a more
“realistic” model of human behavior, as well as a proper and promising way of
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testing policy solutions.9 The proximity of the behavioral approach to policy is
made clear by a recent textbook on the topic, where it is claimed that “[s]
uccessful policy […] must depend on a thorough understanding of human
behavior” (Shaﬁr 2013, 1). Yet the justiﬁcation for the adoption of experi-
mental methods is made without reference to a speciﬁc discipline from which
they stem. Reliance on experiments and on observational data is understood as
more accurate and reliable in providing accounts and explanations of behaviors
than the formulation of abstract and general theories or models.10 The opti-
mism about the capabilities and reach of the behavioral approach is apparent
here. Ulen argues that behavioral scholars “edge incrementally closer to accu-
rate descriptions of the forces shaping human behavior and to understanding
how those forces can be deliberately harnessed” (Ulen 2014, 2).
For us, the following development is important: behavioralists have the
ambition to improve or complement neoclassical economic models as they
have been applied to law. The idea is to propose an alternative account of
behavior and decision making in legal settings.11 Yet in contrast with earlier
episodes in the legal sciences, especially in contrast to the rhetoric of the eco-
nomic analysis of law (at least of some of its proponents, for instance Gary
Becker), the behavioral approach does not formulate “imperialistic” postulates
that show the intention of completely replacing other research programs.
Behavioralists often strike a conciliatory tone (Thaler 2015), and stress the
complementarity, rather than the substitutability, of their approach with prior
approaches. This does not mean, as will be shown below, that the behavioral
approach cannot still be understood as an instance of scientiﬁc imperialism.
2 What is special about the legal sciences?
The debate whether to apply behavioral sciences to law can be seen as a novel
manifestation of a discussion, lasting for more than 100 years, on the question
of the method and scientiﬁc character of legal scholarship. This discussion was
accompanied by a debate on the possibility of bringing non-legal disciplines to
study law. We make this brief historical note because we would like to show
why the legal sciences and their relationship to other scientiﬁc ﬁelds pose a
challenge for deﬁning scientiﬁc imperialism as an interdisciplinary relation. We
will discuss this challenge in more detail in section three, below.
We identify two diﬀerent rationales for why references to “outside” sciences
within legal scholarship have historically been advocated. First, they were made
in order to criticize legal scholarship for its common-sense, non-scientiﬁc
character. The criticism was often accompanied by attempts to establish a new
science of legal phenomena. Second, references to other sciences were made to
analyze the impact of law in order to inform law- and policymakers so that
they could propose more eﬀective laws and regulations. To understand the role
of “outside” sciences in law and their potentially imperialistic character, it is
important to take into account these two rationales and their interplay. The
behavioral approach is, we argue, mainly a manifestation of the latter rationale.
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First, let us focus on the critique of legal scholarship and attempts to treat it
as a proper science that started in the 19th century. In the realm of the con-
tinental legal tradition, Julius Hermann von Kirchman (1848) famously accused
legal dogmatics12 of having quasi-intellectual character: for him, legal dogmatics
was pseudo-science. On the other hand, in the common law tradition, Amer-
ican legal realists (e.g. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Chipman Gray, Herman
Oliphant, Jerome Frank) criticized the “formalistic jurisprudence” and argued
that methods of interpretation of legal norms, methods of legal reasoning, as
well as methods of adjudication, were based on common sense or intuition,
and as such were arbitrary, unjustiﬁed, and unscientiﬁc. Partly as a result of the
critique directed against legal dogmatics, scholars tried to launch the project of
establishing a scientiﬁc legal theory, understood as a discipline explaining legal
phenomena. Some, like Hans Kelsen, argued for the autonomous character of
legal theory. Kelsen proposed his pure theory of law, with its own subject
matter (system of legal norms) and method (transcendental analysis), with the
intent to save the legal sciences from inﬂuences of any “alien elements,” as he
called them (he had in mind mainly the theoretical inﬂuence of sociology)
(Kelsen 1934/1967). On the other side were legal realists who argued for the
application of methods and theories of other (mainly social) sciences in order to
analyze law that was – for them – reducible to facts. Legal realists abandoned
the idea that legal theory had its speciﬁc, autonomous, subject matter and
method – and instead called for the embracing of empirical methods, a call that
ﬁnds its revival today in New Legal Realism (Lang 2015; and Suchman and
Mertz 2010).
Second, in the 20th century, the question about the method and scientiﬁc
character of legal scholarship was accompanied by an interest in the analysis of
the impact that law had on the behavior and decisions of diﬀerent actors. An
analysis of this kind had been present in the realm of American and Scandina-
vian legal realism, sociological jurisprudence, but also in the disciplines that
emerged in the meantime – the sociology of law and psychology of law and,
ﬁnally, in the economic analysis of law. What these approaches had in common
is the belief in oﬀering a more powerful description of human behavior that is
general enough both to explain and predict people’s reactions and responses to
legal norms. One of the discussions that preoccupied scholars was the “gap
problem” between law and behavior – that is, the problem of the discrepancy
between behaviors required by oﬃcial norms and behaviors observed in social
reality. The challenge for behaviorally oriented legal scholars was to get rid of
this discrepancy by making law better suited to the behavioral patterns identi-
ﬁed. In the 1950s and 1960s, hope and emphasis were put on empirical
sociology as a science that could provide insights into how law could inﬂuence
human behavior (Macaulay and Friedman 1969). Since the 1970s, it was eco-
nomics that was supposed to serve this role. Today, we can witness a turn to
the behavioral sciences in law- and policymaking.
In the debate on scientiﬁc imperialism, some draw a distinction between
internally driven imperialism and externally driven imperialism (see Mäki 2013,
258 Magdalena Małecka and Robert Lepenies
Scientific Imperialism; edited by Uskali Mäki, Adrian Walsh and Manuela
Fernández Pinto
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Bembo;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781138059344/
dtp/9781138059344_text.3d;
335). While we believe that the behavioral approach probably represents a mix
of both, what we do want to stress here is the extraordinary receptiveness of
the legal sciences to outside inﬂuences. The brief overview above should
demonstrate that there are diverse rationales for referring to outside theories or
approaches (which are often connected to questions about the scientiﬁc status
of the discipline). Legal scholarship has been methodologically unsteady and at
the same time open to external inﬂuences, as well as prone to internally driven
imperialistic inﬂuences. The overview shows further that in legal scholarship
we have various legal disciplines that all struggle over scientiﬁc status (such as,
for instance, legal theory and legal dogmatics), and that it is nearly impossible to
point to a clearly deﬁned discipline that could represent legal scholarship.
3 Using scientiﬁc imperialism to understand the behavioral
approach – and vice versa
The debate on scientiﬁc imperialism in the philosophy of science has revolved
around the question of the permissibility of the application of scientiﬁc theories
and methods outside the discipline in which they were initially introduced
(“scientiﬁc trespassing”). Philosophers of science have attempted to clarify what
it means for a theory or a discipline to be applied outside its own ﬁeld or
domain, and whether such an application can be understood as imperialistic.
The debate was initiated by John Dupré in his article entitled “Against Scien-
tiﬁc Imperialism.” For him, scientiﬁc imperialism takes place when we have
horizontal relations between theories, that is when theories of diﬀerent kinds
deal with the objects at the same structural level. Dupré formulates his general
remarks on scientiﬁc imperialism on the basis of his analysis of two examples of
imperialistic approaches to studying human behavior: economics (Gerry Beck-
er’s economic analysis of law), and evolutionary biology (Dupré 1995). Dupré
characterizes scientiﬁc imperialism as an application of a “successful scientiﬁc
idea” “far beyond its original domain” (Dupré 2001, 74), so that this applica-
tion cannot “provide much illumination.” Clarke and Walsh, inspired by
Dupré, propose their deﬁnition of scientiﬁc imperialism as “illegitimate occu-
pation by one discipline of another discipline’s territory.”
As Mäki (2013) concisely points out, they identify three possible reasons for
thinking of an occupation as illegitimate: (a) it violates local autonomy; (b) it
exploits local colonized populations by “an unjust extraction of resources”; and
(c) this exploitation “unfairly prevents the exploited from realising their
potential to develop” (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 200, 201). Clarke and Walsh
argue that scientiﬁc imperialism can cause science to fail to progress in a way that
it otherwise would progress. This claim provokes a response from Kidd, who
criticizes them for endorsing an idea of “counterfactual progress” (Kidd 2013).
As mentioned at the beginning of the text, the point of departure for our
analysis of scientiﬁc imperialism is Uskali Mäki’s (2013) account. In his attempt
to explicate the notion of scientiﬁc imperialism, we share many of Mäki’s
intuitions, for instance the introduction of the concept of imperialism of
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standing and his remarks on Dupré (1995), Clarke and Walsh (2009) and Kidd
(2013). Mäki points to the ambiguities in John Dupré’s text, in which Dupré
characterizes scientiﬁc imperialism as an application of a “successful scientiﬁc
idea” “far beyond its original domain” (Dupré 2001, 74), so that this applica-
tion cannot “provide much illumination.” Mäki argues instead that “there is
nothing imperialistic per se in applying a scientiﬁc idea beyond its original
domain of application” (Mäki 2013, 327), and that “the idea of frequent fail-
ure – should [not] be part of a general characterization of scientiﬁc imperialism”
(Mäki 2013, 327) because these views will result in excessive scientiﬁc caution
and risk-aversion. Also, in his discussion with Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh
he emphasizes that “scientiﬁc imperialism is neither suﬃcient nor necessary for
[…] poor explanations” (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 333). Likewise, our account
is indebted to his proposal to incorporate an institutional perspective into the
analysis of scientiﬁc imperialism through the introduction of the notion stand-
ing. However, even though we perceive Mäki’s proposal as an important
advancement in the debate, there are claims in Dupré (1995), as well as in
Clarke and Walsh (2009), which we think must be drawn upon for a convin-
cing account of scientiﬁc imperialism. This concerns their initial intuitions
about the relationship between imperialistic tendencies in science and notions
of scientiﬁc progress presumed by the “imperialist.”
Mäki introduces a distinction between imperialism of scope, style and
standing. For Mäki, imperialism of scope obtains when “an expansionist dis-
cipline seeks to explain phenomena that belong to the perceived domain of
another discipline. This is the pursuit of explanatory uniﬁcation that is dis-
respectful of disciplinary boundaries” (Mäki 2013, 334). Imperialism of style
appears when “the styles and strategies of research, such as the techniques and
standards of inquiry and communication, characteristic of one discipline, are
transferred to, or imposed on, other disciplines” (Mäki 2013, 334). Imperialism
of standing is characterized in the following way: “The academic and non-
academic prestige, power, and resources as well as the acknowledged techno-
logical and political relevance of one discipline increase at the expense of those
of another” (Mäki 2013, 334).
Mäki deﬁnes scientiﬁc imperialism in disciplinary terms – for him, scientiﬁc
imperialism obtains through the relation between disciplines. Yet this under-
standing cannot capture misgivings we may have in the context of references to
“outside” scientiﬁc ﬁndings in law described earlier. Looking at the history of
legal scholarship, it is not clear at all which legal discipline could be imper-
ialized – legal dogmatics, legal theory, jurisprudence? The status and boundaries
of each of the ﬁelds is particularly contested within legal scholarship, their
character as scientiﬁc is still highly debated, and any attempt to explain a notion
of scientiﬁc imperialism in this context will require clariﬁcation of these debates
(and thus to be able to demarcate disciplines clearly). Later we show why a
disciplinary framework is too restrictive when attempting to analyze the
potential imperialism of the behavioral approach.
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As already mentioned, for Mäki the imperialism of scope takes place when
“an expansionist discipline seeks to explain phenomena that belong to the
perceived domain of another discipline.” Yet in the behavioral approach,
ﬁndings of the behavioral sciences are incorporated in order to explain and
predict how people react to legal norms, and not in order to explain legal
phenomena of any kind. Law (legal norms) is treated as given, as a part of the
explanans, and not of the explanandum. Therefore, it would be diﬃcult to
understand the behavioral approach as replacing a traditional legal analysis and
explaining phenomena that previously “belonged” to a speciﬁcally “legal”
domain (that contains “legal phenomena”). Furthermore, it should be noted
that like other historical trends in legal scholarship we mentioned above, the
behavioral approach we ﬁnd today embodies a scientistic attitude. Even though
proponents of the behavioral approach do not want to oﬀer explanations of
legal phenomena or legal norms, they do claim that most of the legal scholarship
and, more importantly, law-making before the “behavioral turn,” was based on
mere intuitions or common-sense generalizations, and that it is the behavioral
approach which provides scientiﬁc advancement and insights to legal
scholarship.
Disciplinary framing cannot help us to understand the imperialism of style
that takes place not due to the fact that a certain way of inquiry proved suc-
cessful in any particular discipline. In contemporary references to behavioral
sciences in law, experimental methods are relied upon as the proper way of
testing hypotheses and collecting observations of behavior that can be a basis for
the formulation of a more “realistic” model of human behavior. Experimental
work and the resulting empirical evidence is understood as more accurate and
superior compared to abstract and general models – like those in neoclassical
law and economics. Instead, the experimental method is advocated not because
of its relation to any particular discipline. Indeed, the superior insight that is
supposedly gained is not justiﬁed by arguing that it proved successful in, for
example, a more advanced discipline, but that the newly introduced approach
is “more accurate” or “scientiﬁc,” or more policy relevant. We think that the
adoption of experimental methods in law and policy can reasonably be called
imperialistic – but that this would elide Mäki’s deﬁnition due to its focus on
relations between disciplines.
Finally, understanding scientiﬁc imperialism in disciplinary terms excludes
certain other interesting cases of scientiﬁc imperialism. We mention here cases
that come into existence because of factors not directly related to disciplines
proper – for example, the imperialism of a certain theory that is owed to its
success in policymaking and politics. Arguably, one factor contributing to the
popularity and inﬂuence of the behavioral approach stems from the eager
reception of both private and public actors outside academia. Here, these pri-
vate and public actors developed and sustained an interest in the behavioral
approach not because of the scientiﬁc advancement it provides (for the expla-
nation of legal phenomena, or for the explanation of mechanisms underlying
human behavior and decision making, for instance), but because of its usefulness
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in direct application – which behavioralists in turn are quick and eager to
provide.13 The behavioral approach is attractive because of its promise to deli-
ver results in the form of allowing policymakers to shape the behavior of their
policy-takers with little eﬀort, cost and hindrance. These developments facil-
itate scientiﬁc imperialism.
The rise of “nudges” in public policy illustrates our point. The so called
“nudge theory” does not provide explanations for why law or policy “work”
in a certain context (the mechanisms responsible for the behavioral impact of
many nudges are still not properly understood; see Grüne-Yanoﬀ 2015).
However, the increased standing of nudging (e.g. through support and
acknowledgment of policymakers) leads to a growing popularity of a certain
brand of behavioral research within legal scholarship. In addition, nudges are
often presented as policy innovations, drawing on the authority of science. It is
the scientiﬁc character of these policy instruments, together with their alleged
eﬀectiveness, that makes them inﬂuential for legal scholars as well as policy-
makers.14 Hence, it can be seen that imperialism can be driven not only by
epistemic advancements that are external or internal to a discipline, but also by
concerns of usefulness in policymaking backed by the invocation of the
authority and progress of science. An account of scientiﬁc imperialism should
be able to accommodate this.
Discarding the disciplinary frame in the debate about scientiﬁc imperialism
does not, of course, imply downplaying the importance of disciplines in scien-
tiﬁc activity or downplaying the usefulness of it for understanding scientiﬁc
imperialism. It may well be that disciplinary reactions to applications of certain
theories or methods to new problems, or ﬁelds, can be informative for a dis-
cussion on scientiﬁc imperialism. In fact, science continues to be materially,
socially and institutionally organized within disciplines. One of the reasons why
there is sometimes opposition to new approaches is precisely the danger of
undermining a given institutional or organizational structure of disciplines
(when, for instance, as Mäki notices, scientiﬁc trespassing leads to undermining
“local disciplinary monopolies”; Mäki 2013, 331). On the other hand, one of
the reasons why a certain theory, research program, or method is able to
expand, can similarly lie in the way in which a particular discipline is institu-
tionalized, or organized. However, it is not the case that theories and methods
of an entire discipline are transferred to another discipline; such transfers are
rather partial. Also, it is not always the case that theories and methods are
transferred because they proved “successful” in one particular discipline (see the
case of the experimental method in the behavioral approach, discussed above).
4 Scientiﬁc imperialism: proposal of an account
4.1 Deﬁnition
For the reasons discussed above, we do not propose to analyze scientiﬁc
imperialism in purely disciplinary terms. Thus, we would like to argue that
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some novel application X of methods, theories, research programs15 becomes
imperialistic when:
1 X is favored (by members of the scientiﬁc community) at the expense of
other methods, or theories, or research programs in terms of academic and
non-academic prestige, power, or resources, and when
2 the attempt of justifying this favoring of X is made by claiming that X is
…
a more “progressive” than applications of other methods, or theories, or
research programs (justiﬁed by the progress in science);16
b more “scientiﬁc” than applications of other methods, or theories, or
research programs (justiﬁed by the progress of science),17
3 claim (2) is assumed to hold without providing an argument for it.
By novel application we understand the application of methods, or theories,
or research programs to problems that have not been analyzed on the basis of
them so far (sometimes in the text we call a novel application also an instance
of scientiﬁc trespassing). Our account emphasizes that instances of scientiﬁc
imperialism require a reason given by the imperialist of why a novel application
is undertaken. However, even if the reason is given, it is not argued for, nor
demonstrated by the imperialist, why the novel application is more progressive.
In order for an onlooker to judge an instance of scientiﬁc trespassing as unjus-
tiﬁed, she must ﬁnd the justiﬁcation questionable by disputing that X is in fact
more scientiﬁc or more progressive. Note that our account builds on the
notion of standing as introduced by Mäki: it means the favoring of certain sci-
entiﬁc theories, or methods, or research programs18 in terms of academic and
non-academic prestige, power, and resources, acknowledged technological and
political relevance at the expense of other theories, or methods, or research
programs.
Furthermore, we argue that scientiﬁc imperialism is an activity that is related
both to a certain view on improvement and progress, as well as to a power to
realize it (it is in fact favored). Otherwise, without pursuing this vision of
improvement, scientiﬁc trespassing is only aggressive, or invasive, but not
imperialistic. Without the power actually to have an eﬀect – that is, actually to
aﬀect the standing between approaches – such an attempt is mere scientiﬁc
quixoticism.
We propose that the “expense” at which one theory is favored over another
should be analyzed both empirically and normatively. In terms of empirical
analysis, improved or worsened standing could be tracked by looking at indicators
such as public money distributed to X rather than other approaches, time spent
in teaching and research on X, the prominence of X in curricula, etc. Much
more sophisticated ways could ascertain the way in which an increase in
standing could be identiﬁed and measured. Here, the debate about scientiﬁc
imperialism could be considerably enhanced and expanded by drawing on the
sociology of science.
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The normative analysis could be advanced by comparing the scope of the
current standing of theories, or methods, or research programs with a standard
of appropriate distribution of standing across disciplines. This standard could be
deﬁned in light of someone’s views on the organization of science, as well as in
light of the view on the epistemic loss related to the institutional favoring of
one approach. We argue that the term “at the expense” denotes an asymme-
trical relation: being in this relation is beneﬁcial for one scientiﬁc approach
while it is harmful for another approach. To put it simply, when we deal with
the phenomenon of scientiﬁc imperialism, we always identify loss (loss of
opportunities, loss of funding, loss of societal relevance) experienced by a cer-
tain theory, research program, or approach. This loss has an epistemic dimen-
sion – it leads to forgoing a certain type of research and knowledge. If someone
does not agree with the distribution of standing resulting from the imperialistic
scientiﬁc trespassing, then one can oppose it as unjustiﬁed in the light of one’s
view on the appropriate distribution of standing.
In order to evaluate the justiﬁcations given for instances of scientiﬁc trespas-
sing, one needs to engage in a philosophical debate on scientiﬁc progress. We
believe that the role of the philosophy of science (in understanding scientiﬁc
imperialism) is to analyze which notions of scientiﬁc progress are being relied
upon when someone makes the charge that a novel application is more pro-
gressive than other theories, or research programs. In the light of our proposal,
philosophy of science helps to reconstruct the notions of scientiﬁc progress that
are presumed in a given account of scientiﬁc imperialism. It should clarify cri-
teria that are used by those making the charge of scientiﬁc imperialism, as well
as by participants in the debate to state when a theory, or a method, or a
research program is more progressive than other theories, or methods, or research
programs, and whether it is more scientiﬁc than other approaches. Our account
then allows for some charges of scientiﬁc imperialism having less plausible jus-
tiﬁcations than others.
Scientiﬁc progress (progress of science) can be examined along diverse dimen-
sions and aspects of science: non-epistemic (economical, professional, educa-
tional, methodical) and epistemic (increase and advancement of knowledge),
following Niiniluoto (1980). As Niiniluoto notes, “these types of progress have
to be conceptually distinguished from advances in other human activities, even
though it may turn out that scientiﬁc progress has at least some factual con-
nections with technological progress (increased eﬀectiveness of tools and tech-
niques) and social progress (economic prosperity, quality of life, justice in
society)” (Niiniluoto 2015).
Progress within science (that is, the scientiﬁc progress of a research program, or a
theory, or a method) can be judged by employing an account of scientiﬁc
progress understood as the increase and advancement of scientiﬁc knowledge.
Following Kitcher (1993), we argue that there is a variety of dimensions of
progress within science (cognitive, conceptual, explanatory).19 The question of
whether an instance of scientiﬁc trespassing is correctly characterized as justiﬁed
and unjustiﬁed requires making explicit an account and dimension of scientiﬁc
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progress in the light of which the expanding theory, or method, or research
program is supported (at the expense of another).
Let us summarize the ways in which scientiﬁc imperialism can be criticized
and opposed in the light of our account. First, when analyzing the expense at
which one application of method, or theory, or research program is favored
over another, one has to adopt a standard of appropriate “distribution” of
standing. If someone opposes this standard, then this person can judge the
novel application as unjustiﬁed in the light of her view on the appropriate dis-
tribution of standing in the organization of science, as well as due to the epis-
temic loss related to the institutional favoring of one approach. Second, one
can analyze whether a novel application is unjustiﬁed according to her views on
scientiﬁc progress (progress of science, or progress in science). A critic can question
the notion of scientiﬁc progress an imperialist is putting forward upon which a
novel application relies. This can be done by either arguing to replace it by
another notion, by demonstrating that the imperialistic approach is not pro-
gressive in the light of the notion of scientiﬁc progress endorsed by its propo-
nents, or by rejecting entirely the very notion of scientiﬁc progress.
Our account does not exclude the possibility of having justiﬁed instances of
scientiﬁc imperialism. It is conceivable that the scientiﬁc community manages
to provide reasons for accepting an epistemic loss resulting from novel appli-
cations, or for accepting the notions of progress endorsed by an imperialist.
However, our deﬁnition says that we face an instance of scientiﬁc imperialism
if the reason for trespassing is not argued for, nor demonstrated by an imperi-
alist, why the novel application is more progressive. This means that even cases
in which justiﬁcations are provided, scientiﬁc imperialism will be always unfair.
Our understanding of unfairness in this context is close to those of Clarke and
Walsh. They hold that the favoring of a particular theoretical perspective is
grounds for criticizing scientiﬁc imperialism because “other theoretical per-
spectives are not given a fair hearing” (Clarke and Walsh 2013, 345).
We would like to emphasize that the above-mentioned types of critique can
overlap. Scientiﬁc imperialism in our view presupposes an understanding of
progress of science or progress in science. Such convictions (concerning the
importance and role of science) can have implications on the view of what
constitutes an appropriate distribution of standing, and therefore, how scientiﬁc
approaches should “treat” each other.20 For example, a behavioralist who
thinks of law and economics as unprogressive might wish for law and eco-
nomics to feature signiﬁcantly less prominently in the education of the next
generation of legal students. However, apart from implying a stance on the
distribution of standing, such convictions also imply a stance on what counts as
“fair interaction between scientiﬁc approaches.” To stick with the example, the
behavioralist here might also hold that it is advantageous that discarded
approaches are to be replaced by the more “progressive” or more “scientiﬁc”
approach. Yet others might have diﬀerent convictions and think that scientiﬁc
approaches generally “deserve” a “fair hearing.”
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In the debate on the notion of scientiﬁc imperialism the link to the notion of
scientiﬁc progress is sometimes made. Dupré notices that imperialistic tenden-
cies that manifest themselves in claims that a particular theory provides the key
in the understanding of a given phenomenon, are often related to the attempts
to provide explanatory uniﬁcation that is presented as “unqualiﬁed scientiﬁc
good.” He criticizes such tendencies for introducing inappropriate methodol-
ogy for studying a given phenomenon. Furthermore, as Clarke and Walsh
point out, Dupré attacks evolutionary psychology and neoclassical economics
for assuming that progress in science will be made as a result of explanatory
uniﬁcation. They mention that on Dupré’s view, “we should make no over-
arching assumptions about the trajectories along which particular scientiﬁc dis-
ciplines will or should progress, but rather should focus closely on empirical
detail, and decide between competing explanations, on their own explanatory
merits, regardless of whether or not these explanations happen to be part of
attempts to unify science” (Clarke and Walsh 2013, 343). This is also the view
that they defend. Clarke and Walsh believe that there may be a progress in
science, even though “there is no one deﬁnitive account of progress […] What
we decide to count as progress in science will be a matter of how we decide to
weigh the various backward-looking factors that contribute to progress”
(Clarke and Walsh 2013, 345). Mäki uses the notion of epistemic scientiﬁc
progress, of advancement in knowledge, “including explanatory knowledge
about the world: growth of explanatory uniﬁcation” (Mäki 2013, 336), in
order to assess scientiﬁc imperialism. He proposes four constraints on scientiﬁc
imperialism (ontological, epistemological, axiological, institutional) that set
conditions for acceptable scientiﬁc imperialism that contributes to scientiﬁc
progress in the sense advocated by him. All of the preceding accounts (Dupré,
Mäki, Clarke and Walsh) are examples of how participants in the debate of
scientiﬁc imperialism bring their convictions about scientiﬁc progress to the
debate.
In our account the notion of scientiﬁc progress already forms part of any
charge of scientiﬁc imperialism, as we argue that it is those novel applications of
theories, methods, or research programs that are imperialistic when they are
supported as being more progressive. The critique of novel applications can
involve questioning their progressive character, or the very notion of scientiﬁc
progress being endorsed by the “imperialists.”
In the next section, we consider whether the behavioral approach can be
seen as a possible instance of scientiﬁc imperialism.
4.2 The behavioral approach and scientiﬁc imperialism: behavioral imperialism?
We can identify two types of reasons why references to the behavioral sciences
are made within legal and policy contexts: progress of science, and progress in sci-
ence. Behavioral sciences are brought to law- and policymaking because the
authority of science is supposed to provide law and policy with knowledge of
the regularities and patterns of human behavior which can then be used in
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order to inﬂuence behavior in an eﬀective manner, hence denoting the progress
of science. At the same time, the behavioral sciences are also advocated as more
progressive – seen as an advancement in comparison with alternative (main-
stream economic) theories applied to law and policy, hence denoting the pro-
gress within science.
In order to state whether the behavioral approach is imperialistic in view of
our account, an empirical analysis would have to be conducted to grasp the
expense at which it is favored, as well as to endorse a notion of scientiﬁc pro-
gress in order to justify applications of behavioral sciences in legal settings. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to perform empirical analysis, or to fully
reconstruct the view of scientiﬁc progress that is presumed within the beha-
vioral approach and that is relied upon to justify the expanding reliance on
behavioral theories and methods. Similarly, we would have to commit our-
selves to a view of progress of science from which the position of the beha-
vioralists could then be critically assessed.
However, at this stage of our investigation we can formulate the following
working hypothesis: proponents of the behavioral approach understand scien-
tiﬁc progress in both epistemic (advancement in explanatory and predictive
power) and non-epistemic (increase in policy relevance and policy impact)
ways. If the behavioral approach is not progressive in the light of a notion of
scientiﬁc progress that is being endorsed – for instance, if proponents of the
behavioral approach support a view of progress in science as advancing expla-
natory progress, but it turns out that they cannot actually oﬀer greater expla-
natory and predictive power than other theories or research programs – and if
the behavioral approach is nevertheless favored at the expense of other
approaches, then the behavioral approach can be criticized as unjustiﬁed in the
light of the view on scientiﬁc progress. Our account of scientiﬁc imperialism allows
the treatment of the behavioral approach as unjustiﬁed also in case one questions
the underlying idea of scientiﬁc progress as advancement in explanatory and
predictive power, or as advancement in practical (policy) impact of research.
Nevertheless, we venture to make two hypotheses here: in the case of actual
eﬀects, we do observe a strong intellectual movement that gradually supplants
(rather than complements) traditional ways to engage in legal and policy ana-
lysis. Likewise, we have provided some textual evidence that shows the
underlying view of progress of science that behavioralists hold and with which
they justify scientiﬁc trespassing. Second, and taking our account seriously, we
would have to commit to a view of progress of science and progress in science
in order to say whether the justiﬁcation of the behavioralists has merit. One
way in which such an argument (which stems from an underlying stance on
what constitutes progress in science) could be made is the following: for us, it is
not obvious that the social sciences should strive similarly towards explanatory
uniﬁcation as is often called for in the natural sciences. We believe that in the
case of the social sciences, we should not strive to achieve “explanatory uni-
ﬁcation,” but rather that it is more important to retain a “cautionary pluralism”
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of social scientiﬁc approaches (similar to what Dupré calls “horizontal
pluralism”).
5 Conclusion
Our analysis of the application of the behavioral sciences to law and policy has
helped us to propose a reﬁned account of scientiﬁc imperialism.
Past and recent developments in legal scholarship lead us to question the
approach to scientiﬁc imperialism as a purely inter-disciplinary phenomenon.
We instead stress the actual impact of changes in the distribution and character
of standing as key to identify instances of scientiﬁc imperialism. Further, we
emphasize that only these instances of scientiﬁc trespassing can be called
imperialistic that endorse and pursue a certain understanding of scientiﬁc pro-
gress and are being justiﬁed by imperializers as more progressive.
To say conclusively whether the behavioral approach is imperialistic or not
requires further (empirical and philosophical) work, yet the groundwork for
such an investigation has been laid here. For now, we have contributed con-
ceptual clariﬁcations and suggestions of how advancement can be made on the
conceptual analysis of the notion of scientiﬁc imperialism.
The role for philosophy of science here is clear: what is needed is a debate
about the conditions of scientiﬁc progress upon which any conception of sci-
entiﬁc imperialism is built.
The role played by sociology of science should also be clear: what is needed
for the identiﬁcation of instances of scientiﬁc imperialism is an empirical matter
as well – and sociological approaches can help to suggest indicators of how to
approximate the “imperial standing” of scientiﬁc approaches.
We hope that our account can be helpful in shedding new light on the
debate on scientiﬁc imperialism, and also explain existing positions in it, as well
as clear up some misunderstandings. Clarke and Walsh are worried that scien-
tiﬁc imperialism can be problematic for epistemic reasons: “the adoption of one
theory, due to its successes in another explanatory domain, leaves us liable to
dismiss rival theories, without properly testing their ability to account for rea-
lity” (Clarke and Walsh 2013, 345). In the light of our account, we could
explicate their worry as a critique of the expense at which one theory or
research program is favored over other scientiﬁc approaches. We stress that in
order to fully spell out this type of critique, it should be clariﬁed what notion
of the fair distribution of standing one endorses. Furthermore, when Dupré
opposes an idea of scientiﬁc uniﬁcation while analyzing examples of applica-
tions of economics to new ﬁelds, our account can help clarify and understand
the source of his anxiety. Dupré opposes these applications because he does not
believe that progress in science stems from the realization of the pursuit of
uniﬁcation, and he is worried by the extent to which applications of economics
and evolutionary biology, advocated in the spirit of uniﬁcatory crusade, are
favored at the expense of other approaches to analysis of human behavior.
Mäki, on the other hand, believes that science progresses through explanatory
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uniﬁcation. His normative evaluation of scientiﬁc imperialism is proposed as
“constraints on the pursuit of explanatory uniﬁcation across disciplinary
boundaries” (Mäki 2013, 336). A legitimate instance of scientiﬁc trespassing for
him is one that is argued for in the light of these conditions. We do not oppose
this view – our account permits that this is a reasonable approach to justifying
instances of scientiﬁc trespassing. What we would like to stress, however, is this:
it is possible to question this stance on the grounds of a diﬀerent understanding of
scientiﬁc progress.
Notes
1 “[T]he behavioral perspective occupies a respectable and increasingly popular niche
in many graduate programs in economics, business, law, policy, and the social sci-
ences more generally. And thus we have arrived at a point where it is only natural
to explore how best to incorporate elements of the behavioral perspective into
policy thinking” (Shaﬁr 2013, 1). “My belief is that behavioral law is one of the
most important developments – and probably the most important – in legal scho-
larship of the modern era” (Ulen 2014, 14).
2 See the Social and Behavioral Science Team (SBST) of the US White House; the
Behavioral Insights Team in the UK. Increasingly, international organizations com-
mission behavioral studies, for example, the EU’s Directorate-General for Health
and Consumers (DG SANCO) or the recently formed Global Insights Initiative
team at the World Bank. At the same time, see several associations bring together
like-minded behavioralists, such as the European Nudging Network (TEN) and
other national associations (such as the Behavioral Science & Policy Association).
3 Other seminal texts for the behavioral approach are Camerer et al. (2003); Sunstein
(2000); Korobkin and Ulen (2000).
4 Shaﬁr (2013) argues that there are “many ways in which our new understanding,
this new view of the human agent, might help design and implement better public
policy” (Shaﬁr 2013, 9). Strassheim et al. (2015) analyze behavioral expertise com-
paratively; they show that the behavioral approach was partly a response to the criticism
of “new public management” and “evidence-based policy” approaches arguing that
the behavioral approach “promised a renewed state-science-citizen relationship in
which scientiﬁc experts and political actors would become collaborators.”
5 See the contributions of Cserne, Feldman and Lobel in Alemanno and Sibony
(2015); Nourse and Shaﬀer (2009); Mitchell (2014, 2002); Posner (1998); Arlen
(1998).
6 Thus far, economics imperialism (e.g. Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2010; Mäki 2009) is
the most-debated example. See also (Clarke and Walsh 2009; Davis 2012; Dupré
1995). Other accounts include, e.g. geographical economics (Mäki and Marchionni
2011; Marchionni 2012), and the case of evolutionary psychology in international
relations (Bell 2006).
7 See the debate between Clarke and Walsh (2009, 2013), Kidd (2013) and Mäki
(2013), inspired by the text of Dupré (1995).
8 We regard scientiﬁc imperialism, like most commentators in the debate, as an
inherently pejorative term that deﬁes a purely neutral or descriptive deﬁnition. How-
ever, we will not explicitly draw upon political metaphors, which is an approach
that other participants in the debate have taken (Stigler 1984; Dupré 1995).
9 See e.g.: “regulations [should be] written and implemented in ways that lend
themselves to experimental evaluation and creation of independent review to assess
the eﬀectiveness of regulations” (Sunstein 2011, 1391, our emphasis).
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10 Ulen claims that behavioral ﬁndings used in the legal academy and well known
within the social science community “are not theoretical; they are empirical” (Ulen
2014, 2). Korobkin and Ulen argue that behavioral law and economics can develop
“without a grand, overarching theory of behavior so long as one has a due regard for the
relevant decision-making capacities of the actors in that speciﬁc setting. By bor-
rowing from psychological and sociocultural theories in addition to economics, the
law-and-behavioral-science approach consciously chooses to emphasize its external
usefulness in analyzing legal problems rather than either its internal elegance or uni-
versal applicability” (Korobkin and Ulen 2000, 1058, our emphasis). See also: van
Gestel and van Dijck 2011; and Ranchordás 2013.
11 Their insistence is to continue using “the tools of traditional economic analysis”
(Jolls et al. 1998, 1474), being “deeply constructive” (ibid., 1475), and “enriching
the traditional economic framework” and not to “undermine it” (ibid., 1475).
Opinions diverge, however, on whether and to what extent economic analysis of
law is compatible with behavioral approaches. See e.g. Nourse and Shaﬀer (2009),
who also regard the behavioral approach as correcting law and economics. It is also
claimed that expected utility theory underlies neoclassical law and economics,
whereas behavioral law and economics is based on the alternative theory of decision
making – prospect theory. See Arlen and Talley 2008.
12 Legal dogmatics, mainly in continental tradition, is a branch of legal sciences ana-
lyzing a law in force enacted by a lawmaker.
13 See e.g. “Low-cost regulatory policies, such as disclosure and simpliﬁcation, may be
justiﬁed even if we do not have a clear understanding, in the abstract, of whether
the relevant behavior is mostly a product of loss aversion or social inﬂuences”
(Sunstein 2011, 1362).
14 We would like to argue that this scientistic attitude should be included in the
account of scientiﬁc imperialism. We include it in our account and argue that sci-
entiﬁc imperialism is often being justiﬁed by its proponents as more “scientiﬁc.”
This claim presupposes a certain notion of a progress of science. See more in sec-
tions 4.1. and 4.2.
15 By novel, we mean that speciﬁc applications are being brought to problems that
have not been analyzed by these applications before. We used the short-hand term
“scientiﬁc trespassing” to describe these instances (see also Hirschman 1981).
Another word used in the literature is the term “horizontal relations” by Dupré.
16 It should be noted here that an analysis of scientiﬁc progress also has a normative
component. Progress is a normative concept that should be distinguished from a
notion of “change” and of “development” (Niiniluoto 1995). Progress within sci-
ence means improvement judged through the criteria for “good science.”
17 For example, when a scientiﬁc approach is brought to practically oriented ﬁelds of
study, it is sometimes claimed that it will make it more scientiﬁc. Here we have a
move from non-science to science (justiﬁcation through the progress of science).
However, if, for instance, prospect theory is claimed to replace or complement
expected utility theory, it is believed that it will lead to scientiﬁc progress under-
stood as progress within science. Here we have a move from one scientiﬁc theory to a
more advanced one. These reasons can also overlap.
18 Mäki speaks about disciplines, but for the reasons mentioned above we resign from
a disciplinary frame in our analysis.
19 See also Mäki (2002) and his list of perspectives from which scientiﬁc progress can
be analyzed.
20 This account of standing presupposes that the distribution of standing is in some
respect a zero-sum game: scientiﬁc approaches compete for scarce resources and
attention. However, the notion of standing is not conﬁned to such questions of
distributional fairness. Instead, it can also encompass questions of relational fairness:
not giving a fair hearing to a speciﬁc scientiﬁc approach could be unfair regardless of
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how resources and attention are distributed but instead be unfair because it unfairly
treats a competing approach as having a less-than-equal status.
References
Alemanno, Alberto and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds). 2015. Nudge and the Law: A European
Perspective. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Alexander, Gregory S. 2002. “Comparing the Two Legal Realisms: American and
Scandinavian.” Journal of American Comparative Law 50: 131–174.
Arlen, Jennifer. 1998. “Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law.” Vanderbilt Law Review 51: 1765–1770.
Arlen, Jennifer H. and Eric L. Talley (eds). 2008. Experimental Law and Economics.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” The Journal of
Political Economics 76(2): 169–217.
Bell, Duncan. 2006. “Beware of False Prophets: Biology, Human Nature and the
Future of International Relations Theory.” International Aﬀairs 82: 493–510.
Camerer, Colin, Samuel Issacharoﬀ, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue and Mat-
thew Rabin. 2003. “Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151: 1211–1254.
Clarke, Steve and Adrian Walsh. 2009. “Scientiﬁc Imperialism and the Proper Relations
Between the Sciences.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23: 195–207.
Clarke, Steve and Adrian Walsh. 2013. “Imperialism, Progress, Developmental Tele-
ology, and Interdisciplinary Uniﬁcation.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 27(3): 341–351.
Cooter, Robert. 1981. “Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to
Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books.” UCLA Law Review
29: 1260–1269.
Cooter, Robert Ulen and Thomas Ulen. 2004. Law and Economics. Fourth edition.
Boston: Addison Wesley.
Davis, John B. 2012. “Mäki on Economics Imperialism.” In Aki Lehtinen, Jaakko
Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski (eds). Economics for Real. London: Routledge, pp. 203–
219.
Dupré, John. 1995. “Against Scientiﬁc Imperialism.” In PSA 1994: Proceedings of the
1994 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2. East Lansing, MI:
Philos Sci Association, pp. 374–381.
Dupré, John. 2001.Human Nature and the Limits of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epstein, Richard A. 1997. “Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future.”
The University of Chicago Law Review 64: 1167–1174.
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Grüne-Yanoﬀ, Till. 2015. “Why Behavioural Policy Needs Mechanistic Evidence.”
Economics and Philosophy: 1–21.
Haack, Susan. 2011. Defending Science – Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism.
New York: Prometheus Books.
Haack, Susan. 2012. “Six Signs of Scientism.” Logos and Episteme 3(1): 75–95.
Hacker, Philipp. 2015. “The Behavioral Divide. A Critique of the Diﬀerential Imple-
mentation of Behavioral Law and Economics in the US and the EU.” European
Review of Contract. Law 11(4): 299–345.
Is the behavioral approach scientiﬁc imperialism? 271
Scientific Imperialism; edited by Uskali Mäki, Adrian Walsh and Manuela
Fernández Pinto
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Bembo;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781138059344/
dtp/9781138059344_text.3d;
Hirschman, Albert O. 1981. Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hookway, Christopher. 2010. “Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reﬂections on
Fricker.” Episteme 7(2): 151–163.
Jolls, Christine, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler. 1998. “A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics.” Stanford Law Review: 1471–1550.
Kelman, Mark. 1988. “On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical
and ‘Empirical’ Practice of the Public Choice Movement.” Vanderbilt Law Review74:
199–273.
Kelsen, Hans. 1967. Pure Theory of Law. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Kidd, James I. 2013. “Historical Contingency and the Impact of Scientiﬁc Imperialism.”
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27(3): 315–324.
Kirchman, Julius Hermann. 2000 [1848]. Die Wertlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wis-
senschaft. Heidelberg: Manutius Verlag, 2. Auﬂage.
Kitcher, Philip. 1993. The Advancement of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Korobkin, Russell and Thomas Ulen. 2000. “Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics.” California Law Review 88: 1051–1144.
Kuorikoski, Jaakko and Aki Lehtinen. 2010. “Economics Imperialism and Solution
Concepts in Political Science.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40: 347–374.
Landes, William and Richard Posner. 1993. “The Inﬂuence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study.” Journal of Law and Economics 36(1), Part 2: 385–424.
Lang, Andrew. 2015. “New Legal Realism, Empiricism, and Scientism: The Relative
Objectivity of Law and Social Science.” Leiden Journal of International Law 28(2): 231–254.
Lepenies, Robert and Magdalena Małecka. 2015. “The Institutional Consequences of
Nudging–Nudges, Politics, and the Law.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6: 427–437.
Macaulay, Stewart and Lawrence M. Friedman. 1969. Law and the Behavioral Sciences.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company.
Mäki, Uskali. 2002. “Scientiﬁc Progress: Complexities of a Contestable Concept.” In
Stephan Böhm, Christian Gehrke, Heinz D. Kurz and Richard Sturn (eds). Is There
Progress in Economics?Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 123–130.
Mäki, Uskali. 2009. “Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints.” Philosophy of
the Social Sciences9: 351–380.
Mäki, Uskali. 2013. “Scientiﬁc Imperialism: Diﬃculties in Deﬁnition, Identiﬁcation, and
Assessment.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27(3): 325–339.
Mäki, Uskali and Caterina Marchionni. 2011. “Is Geographical Economics Imperializing
Economic Geography?” Journal of Economic Geography 11(4): 645–665.
Marchionni, Caterina. 2012. “Geographical Economics and its Neighbors – Forces
Towards and Against Uniﬁcation.” Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of
Economics 13: 425–458.
Martin, Michael. 1997. Legal Realism American and Scandinavian. New York: P. Lang.
Medema, Steven G. 1998. “The Trial of Homo Economicus: What Law and Eco-
nomics Tells Us about the Development of Economic Imperialism.” In John B. Davis
(ed.). New Economics and its History. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 122–142.
Mitchell, Gregory. 2002. “Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should not be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence.” Georgetown Law
Journal 91: 83–119.
Mitchell, Gregory. 2014. “Alternative Behavioral Law and Economics.” In Oxford
Handbook of Behavioral Economics and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167–
191.
272 Magdalena Małecka and Robert Lepenies
Scientific Imperialism; edited by Uskali Mäki, Adrian Walsh and Manuela
Fernández Pinto
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Bembo;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781138059344/
dtp/9781138059344_text.3d;
Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1980. “Scientiﬁc Progress.” Synthese 45: 427–464.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1995. “Is There Progress in Science?” In H. Stachowiak (ed.). Prag-
matik, Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens. Band V, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, pp.
30–58.
Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 2015. “Scientiﬁc Progress.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientiﬁc-p-rogress/.
Nourse, Victoria and Gregory Shaﬀer. 2009. “Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a
New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?” Cornell Law Review 95: 61–138.
Posner, Richard. 1977. Economic Analysis of Law. Second edition. Boston: Little, Brown.
Posner, Richard. 1998. “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law.” Stan-
ford Law Review: 1551–1575.
Pound, Roscoe. 1908. “Mechanical Jurisprudence.” Columbia Law Review 8: 605–623.
Ranchordás, Soﬁa. 2013. “The Whys and Woes of Experimental Legislation.” Theory
and Practice of Legislation 1(3): 415–440.
Shaﬁr, Eldar. 2013. The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Shavell, Steven. 2009. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Stigler, George J. 1984. “Economics – The Imperial Science?” Scandinavian Journal of
Economics86: 301–313.
Strassheim, Holger, Arlena Jung and Rebecca-Lea Korinek. 2015. “Reframing Exper-
tise: The Rise of Behavioural Insights and Interventions in Public Policy.” In A.
Berthoin Antal, M. Hutter and D. Stark (eds). Moments of Valuation. Exploring Sites of
Dissonance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 249–268.
Strassheim, Holger and Pekka Kettunen. 2014. “When Does Evidence-based Policy
Turn into Policy-based Evidence? Conﬁgurations, Contexts and Mechanisms.” Evi-
dence and Policy 10(2): 259–277.
Suchman, Mark C. and Elizabeth Mertz. 2010. “Toward a New Legal Empiricism:
Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism.” Annual Review of Law and Social
Science6: 555–579.
Sunstein, Cass R. 1997. “Behavioral Analysis of Law.” University of Chicago Law Review
64(4): 1175–1195.
Sunstein, Cass R. 2000. “Introduction.” In Cass Sunstein (ed.). Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–10.
Sunstein, Cass R. 2011. “Empirically Informed Regulation.” University of Chicago Law
Review 78(4): 1349–1429.
Thaler, Richard H. 2015. Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. New York
City: W.W. Norton & Company.
Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ulen, Thomas. 2014. “The Importance of Behavioral Law.” In Elyan Zamir and Doron
Teichman (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Van Gestel, Rob and Gijs van Dijck. 2011. “Better Regulation through Experimental
Legislation.” European Public Law 17(3): 539–553.
White, Mark D. 2015. “Introduction.” In Mark D. White (ed.). Law and Social Eco-
nomics. Essays in Ethical Values for Theory, Practice, and Policy. Basingstoke: Springer.
Zelizer, Viviana A. 1988. “Beyond the Polemics on the Market: Establishing a Theo-
retical and Empirical Agenda.” Sociological Forum 3(4): 614–634.
Is the behavioral approach scientiﬁc imperialism? 273
